National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC)

NIAC Chemical, Biological and Radiological Events and the Critical Infrastructure Workforce

Status Report July 11, 2006

Martha H. Marsh President and CEO Clinics

Chief Rebecca F. Denlinger Fire Chief Stanford Hospital and Cobb County, GA Fire and Rescue

Bruce Rohde Chairman and CEO **Emeritus** ConAgra Foods, Inc.

Overview

- Objective/Scope
- Assumptions
- Key Questions
- Critical Sectors Represented
- Findings
- Transition to Pandemic Working Group
- Discussion

Objective and Scope

Objective:

Provide recommendations for keeping those who work in and maintain areas considered Critical Infrastructure (CI) prepared for a biological event and ensure they have the tools, training, and equipment they need to identify, respond to, and recover from a biological emergency

■ Scope of the activity:

- Identify CI operating personnel and biological emergency requirements
- Identify how needs are currently handled; Identify vulnerabilities in preparedness and response capabilities
- Identify gaps and solutions

3

Assumptions

■ Scope:

- Will focus on biological preparedness, training, awareness, response processes, response tools and technologies, response coordination, etc.
- Will focus on post-incident continuity and recovery capabilities
- Will not focus on specific threats or threat vectors
- Will focus on high-risk critical infrastructure, key interdependencies, and public-private sector linkages
- Will address both strategic and appropriate tactical issues
 - Example: strategic awareness issue across an entire critical infrastructure sector vs. lack of tactical communications capability between local and state first responders

4

Key Questions

Focus on common set of data points to collect across critical sectors; contributes to trending/consistency

- Do CEOs and their organizations have employee awareness, preparedness and response training programs?
- Is there a market incentive to invest in biological preparedness and response programs?
- Is there sufficient communication infrastructure in place to respond to a biological event?
- What tools and technologies currently support your biological response capability?

5

Key Questions (cont.)

- What tools and technologies are currently insufficient and why do they not meet your requirements?
- Is there sufficient coordination between federal, state, local and private-sector entities?
- What can the federal government do to encourage or facilitate enhanced preparedness and response capabilities?
- What are key inter-dependencies in a biological event?
- What are the three or four critical vulnerabilities facing your organization today?

Critical Sectors Represented

- ☐ Critical sectors and leads include:
 - Fire/EMS
 - Food and Agriculture
 - Healthcare
 - Water
 - Finance
 - Communications
 - State and Local
 - Electricity
 - Information Technology
 - Commercial Facilities
 - Transportation

7

Findings

Findings that identified positive efforts or trends included:

- Finding #1: Awareness
 - Tremendous degree of awareness across all elements of the critical infrastructure, federal, state and local governments
- ☐ Finding #2: Organizational leadership
 - Multiple organizations dedicated leadership to biological event preparedness
 - Organization-wide preparedness activities being driven from highest levels
- ☐ Finding #3: Preparedness
 - Coordinated biological event response plans and exercises are becoming more commonplace.

Findings (cont.)

Findings that suggested preparedness and response risk included:

- □ Finding #1: Sustained Response
 - Sustained response (greater than 72 hours) efforts highly dependent upon uninterrupted provisioning of electric and water utilities and functioning logistics infrastructure
- ☐ Finding #2: Health and Welfare
 - Ability to deliver services correlates directly to health and welfare of responders and providers
 - Health and welfare of family members of particular concern
- Finding #3: Communications
 - Opportunities exist to improve communications capabilities and processes between responders and inter-dependent entities (i.e. law enforcement, transportation, emergency response, utilities, etc.)

9

Findings (cont.)

- ☐ Finding #4: Response Coordination
 - Federal, state, local and private sector response efforts require greater, and more detailed levels of coordination and planning
- ☐ Finding #5: Logistics
 - Logistical support for biological events remains a concern
 - Specific questions around vaccinations, resource delivery, and prioritization of services requires greater study and definition
 - Concerns exist around logistical surge capacity